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This paper presents experimental evidence about how individuals learn from infor-
mation that comes from inside versus outside their ethnic group. In the experiment,
Thai subjects observed information that came from Americans and other Thais that
they could use to help them answer a series of questions. Two main ￿ndings emerge.
First, subjects display overcon￿dence in their own opinions and place too low a value
on the information that they observe. Second, conditional on this overcon￿dence, sub-
jects weigh American information relative to Thai information in a nearly optimal way.
The data also indicates that subjects appear to understand that outside information
has extra value because people from di⁄erent groups know di⁄erent things and so have
an opportunity to learn from each other.
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11 Introduction
For economic agents to make optimal decisions, they need to use information e⁄ectively. A
large body of research shows that individuals who fail to do so su⁄er large welfare losses.
Some of the most striking examples of this concept come from developing countries. Previous
research has looked at how information sharing within social networks a⁄ects technology
adoption in India and Kenya (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Du￿ o, Kremer, and Robinson
(2004), Munshi (2004)). Information sharing, or lack thereof, also a⁄ects public health
in Kenya, Bolivia, and Bangladesh (Dearden, Pritchett, and Brown (2004), Miguel and
Kremer (2004), Munshi and Myaux (2002)). In the US, information sharing within social
groups improves agents￿savings decisions (Du￿ o and Saez (2002)). These papers show that
individuals put high weight on information learned from others within their own group and
that information sharing between groups often does not occur. This lack of sharing may
come with costs, as listening to outside opinions may help individuals make better decisions.
Information that comes from outside the group may have extra value in that people from
di⁄erent groups know di⁄erent things and so have an opportunity to learn from each other.1
An agent who has access to a variety of information needs to decide how to weigh in-
formation that comes from inside her group relative to information from outside her group.
The agent also needs to decide how much or how little she weighs any kind of observed in-
formation. For example, an overcon￿dent agent may decide that she does not need to listen
to her neighbors or to others from outside the community when deciding what technology
to adopt. A large literature shows that individuals exhibit overcon￿dence in a variety of
environments (Gri¢ n and Tversky (1992), Keren (1987), Gigerenzer, Ho⁄rage, and Klein-
bolting (1991), Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). Overcon￿dent agents will su⁄er welfare losses
by placing too little emphasis on others￿opinions.
When making decisions, agents may deviate from the optimum either by not listening
1In the context of US corporations, Menon and Pfe⁄er (2003) discuss the value of information that comes
from independent consultants due to their outside perspective.
2enough to others￿opinions or by putting excessive weight on one group over another, or both.
This paper tests for these behaviors experimentally. In the experiment, subjects consider
opinions that come from sources with di⁄erent cultural backgrounds. Thai subjects ￿rst
answer a series of general-knowledge questions that have correct numerical answers. The
subjects then observe randomly selected answers given by Americans and by other Thais,
who had answered the same questions at an earlier date, that they can use to help them
revise their answers. By looking at how subjects change their answers, the experimental
design provides estimates of the weights that subjects apply to observed American answers,
to observed Thai answers, and to their own initial answers. I compare these weights to
the optimal weights a subject should use to maximize her payments. The optimal weights
that subjects should use take into account the quality of American answers relative to Thai
answers and also incorporate the extra value in American answers to a Thai subject stemming
from the fact that Americans and Thais know di⁄erent things. The data shows that, even
when any one Thai answer is equally good as any one American answer, an optimizing Thai
should assign signi￿cantly higher weight to American answers than to other Thai answers.
This extra value comes from the fact that, in the data, Americans and Thais tend to make
di⁄erent kinds of mistakes. When members of the same group tend to make the same kind
of mistake, an agent from any group has more to learn from members of a di⁄erent group
than from other members of her own group.
Except for the questions that pertain to Bangkok or Thailand, subjects appear to un-
derstand this idea. Subjects underweigh American information relative to Thai information
for questions pertaining to Bangkok or Thailand. When the questions do not refer directly
to Bangkok or Thailand, though, subjects behave optimally in how they weigh Americans
relative to Thais. In all cases, subjects do not listen to either group nearly enough in that
they assign far too much weight to their own initial answers. Subjects have much more
to gain by reducing this overcon￿dence in their initial answers than they do by changing
how they weigh American answers relative to answers given by other Thais. On average,
subjects could improve the mean squared error of their answers about ￿fteen times more
by lowering the weight given to their initial answers than by changing how they relatively
3weigh observed American and observed Thai answers. The data also suggests that subjects
appreciate not only how good each group is at answering the questions, but also the extra
value of an American￿ s independent perspective to a Thai decision-maker. In summary,
subjects optimally weigh observed American answers relative to observed Thai answers, but
they overvalue their own opinions.
Section 2 describes the experimental design. In Section 3, I model the process of using
information to make decisions. Section 4 contains the summary statistics that describe the
distributions of American and Thai answers to the questions. In Section 5, I estimate the
weights subjects give to the information they observe and test a variety of hypotheses that
explain that behavior. Section 6 tests the hypothesis that subjects both understand that
Americans and Thais make di⁄erent kinds of mistakes and apply this knowledge to their
decisions. In Section 7, I look at how subjects could have improved their performance by
changing their behavior in various ways. Section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, American students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
and Thai students from Thammasat University￿ s Rangsit campus answered a series of general
knowledge questions. At a later date, separate groups of Thai students from Thammasat￿ s
Bangkok campus and from the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)
answered the same questions. These students then observed randomly selected answers,
given by the MIT and Rangsit students, which they could use to revise their answers.
2.1 The Questionnaire
The questionnaire consists of ￿fteen questions covering a range of topics. Most of the ques-
tions contain three distinct parts. For example, one question asks about the January
4temperature in Bangkok, the January temperature in Boston, and the sum of those tem-
peratures. Another question asks for the number of Thai prime ministers since 1960, the
number of American presidents since 1960, and the sum of those two numbers. A third
question asks about the number of Thai and American 25-29 year-olds with some university
education, as well as the sum of those two numbers. Figure 1 shows the format of the
questions. Appendix A.1 contains the entire questionnaire and instructions, showing the
format for all of the questions.
From 1961-1990, average
daily high temperature in
January in Boston
______ °C + ______ °C = ______ °C
Figure 1:  Format of the questions
From 1961-1990, average
daily high temperature in
January in Bangkok
Sum
The di¢ culty of the questions used in this experiment could lead to substantial overcon￿-
dence. Previous research has shown that subjects show overcon￿dence when asked to answer
general knowledge questions and that increased question di¢ culty ampli￿es this overcon￿-
dence (Gri¢ n and Tversky (1992)). The experimental design makes it possible to separately
estimate how overcon￿dence a⁄ects subject behavior and how behavior is a⁄ected by sub-
jects￿perceptions about American information compared to information provided by other
Thais.
2.2 Stage 1: Creating a pool of American and Thai answers
In Stage 1 of the experiment, 116 introductory economics students at MIT and 130 intro-
ductory economics students at Thammasat University￿ s Rangsit campus answered the series
of questions, giving estimates of the population distribution of beliefs for each question.
Students had 15 minutes to answer the survey. In both countries, students answered the
5questionnaire at the end of introductory economics classes. In Thailand, the questionnaire
and instructions were given in Thai.2 Each group answered the questions in the standard
units prevailing in their respective countries. For example, Americans answered tempera-
ture questions in degrees Fahrenheit and Thais answered temperature questions in degrees
Celsius.
Subjects received monetary rewards for answering accurately. For the American students,
the top three performers on the entire set of questions received $50 each and the top ￿fteen
performers on the individual questions received $10 each. Among the Thai students, the top
￿ve performers on the overall questionnaire received 1000 baht (approximately $25) and the
top twenty on the individual questions received 200 baht. The additional rewards for the
Thai students re￿ ected the larger sample size.
Subjects also answered an optional personal survey before completing the questionnaire.
The American students were asked to indicate their country of citizenship and the coun-
try where they attended high school, since some MIT undergraduates are citizens of other
countries. Excluding this group of students from the sample has a negligible e⁄ect on the
distribution of answers. Therefore, random selection of answers was based on the entire set
of MIT students.
2.3 Stage 2: Subjects observe American and Thai information
In Stage 2, 300 economics undergraduates at Thammasat￿ s Bangkok campus and master￿ s
economics students at the National Institute for Development Administration (NIDA) ￿rst
received instructions in Thai (both read aloud and given in a packet) and then answered the
questionnaire. Subjects were informed that they would receive 100 baht for participating
and 20 baht for each question that they answered within a range of the correct answer. The
incentives were intended to approximately provide subjects with the objective of minimizing
the MSE of their answers, while keeping the instructions as simple as possible. The data
2Multiple translations and re-translations, as well as two pilots, veri￿ed the questionnaire￿ s accuracy.
6shows that a subject who maximized her payments would behave in basically the same way
as a MSE minimizer. In other words, the experimental design succeeds in giving subjects
the objective function of minimizing MSE.
In Stage 2, subjects ￿rst answered all of the questions using Microsoft Excel in com-
puter labs at NIDA and Thammasat. They directly answered the Bangkok/Thailand and
Boston/US questions, and the sum was calculated from those answers. After all subjects
answered the questions, they received a second set of instructions. Subjects were told that
they would observe randomly selected answers from MIT and Thammasat-Rangsit students
who answered the same set of questions. These answers were provided in a separate packet.
For each question, subjects saw the heading ￿Answers from Thai students￿followed by the
Thai information, and then ￿Answers from American students￿followed by the American
information. Payments were based on subjects￿￿nal answers. Figure 2 shows what one
group of the Thai subjects saw for the questions about political leaders.
Since January 1, 1960,
number of American
presidents
______ + ______ = ______
1.    15 + 1.    20 = 1.    35
1.    1 + 1.    9 = 1.    10
2.    5 2.    7 2.    12
3.    7 3.    10 3.    17
Answers given by Thai students
Answers given by American students
Figure 2:  Sample of information that subjects observe
Since January 1, 1960,
number of Thai prime
ministers
Sum
The subjects in this group observe that one randomly selected Thai student thought the
number of Thai prime ministers was 15, the number of American presidents was 20, and
the sum was 35. They also observe that a randomly selected American student thought
7thought the answers were 1, 9, and 10, respectively. A second American student thought
the answers were 5, 7, and 12; a third American students thought the answers were 7, 10,
and 17.
In addition to the answers themselves, I randomly selected three features of the data that
subjects observe: 1) the type of question (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum) for which
subjects observe information, 2) how many Thai students￿answers subjects observe, and 3)
how many American students￿answers subjects observe. For each question, a subject saw
information about either the Bangkok/Thailand part, the Boston/US part, the sum part,
or all three, each with probability 1
4. Subjects observed up to three American answers and
up to three Thai answers. The subjects who saw the information in Figure 2 observed one
Thai opinion and three American opinions for all three parts of the question about political
leaders. Subjects could observe any of twenty randomly selected sets of American and Thai
answers.
2.4 Controlling for anchoring
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that individuals will tend to stick to a number that is
given to them, even when that number is irrelevant to the question at hand, a phenomenon
they called anchoring. In their example, an experimenter spins a wheel in front of a group
of students. Then students answer a question about the number of African countries in
the UN. When the wheel gives a higher number, students give much larger answers. In
my experiment, subjects ￿rst answer the questions and then update their answers based on
what they observe. Thus, anchoring presents a serious concern in this experiment; a subject
provides her own answer that she can anchor to and that number contains meaning relevant
to the task, unlike the random number which a⁄ects students￿answers about countries in
the UN.
Due to these concerns, an additional 42 students observed information and answered
the questions without ￿rst providing their private beliefs. To test for anchoring, I compare
8these students to the students in the main treatment group. Subjects in the main group
may anchor to their initial answers because they express them. In the experimental data, a
subject who anchors would fail to su¢ ciently change the answer that she gives after observing
new information. If anchoring is present in the main group, the 42 subjects who do not
provide their private beliefs will choose ￿nal answers closer to the answers they observe.3
The data will show that anchoring has a small and statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ect on subject
behavior in this experiment.
3 A Model of Information Aggregation
3.1 Summary statistics
Here, I describe a model of information aggregation that shows how the Thai subjects should
weigh the information they see under the assumption that they are mean-squared error min-
imizers. I consider each question type (Bangkok/Thailand, Boston/US, or sum) separately.
In later sections, I show that the primary results do not depend on any of the model￿ s
assumptions. Moreover, the data con￿rms the validity of the assumptions.
For a question q, take individual i in group j, where the groups are American and Thai,
to have a private signal xijq about the correct answer for the question. The MSE, ￿2
jq, for a










3In addition, 50 of the 300 students in the main group observed large samples for two questions. Subjects
saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers. The model of information aggregation presented in
the next section applies to any amounts of American and Thai information that subjects observe. Subjects
may treat large amounts of information di⁄erently, though, due either to di¢ culties with processing all the
information or to a lower bound to the weight a subject will give to herself. The presence of large samples
makes it possible to see how subjects behave when they see large amounts of information. Results describing
how subjects behave when they observe large samples are available upon request.
9where Nj is the number of group j members in the sample and Truthq is the correct answer
for question q. A group that is comparatively better at answering a question will have a
lower MSE for that question. The population distributions of American and Thai answers
give estimates for the MSE for Americans and the MSE for Thais for each question q.
The group MSE can be broken down into consistent estimators for the sample variance
for the group (s2
jq) and the squared group bias (￿2
jq), where xjq is the mean answer given by
group j for question q.










(xjq ￿ Truthq)2, the MSE








Proof. See Appendix A.2.1
This decomposition re￿ ects the fact that the total error made by the group consists of
individual and group components. The individual component comes from the variation in
answers given by members of the same group and the group component comes from the
distance between the group mean and the correct answer.






For group j for question q, ￿jq captures what share of total MSE comes from the common
group bias. If individuals in group j tend to make di⁄erent kinds of mistakes from other
individuals in their group, ￿jq will be low, as MSE will primarily be caused by individual-
level variation. If people in a group make the same kind of mistake, ￿jq will be high, as
group bias will cause most of the group￿ s MSE.





T ; which captures how accurately the Americans answer the questions relative to
10Thais, 2) the American group bias share, ￿A, which captures the share of American MSE for
which group bias is responsible, and 3) the Thai group bias share, ￿T, which captures the
share of Thai MSE for which group bias is responsible.




jq, and b ￿jq = xjq ￿ Truthq,

























Proof. See Appendix A.2.2
These three parameters determine an optimal rule for how the Thai subjects should weigh
the information they observe if they apply the same rule across questions. If the group bias
share for Americans is low, for example, then multiple American guesses would provide
signi￿cantly more information about the correct answer than a single American opinion. A
high American group bias share, however, implies that Americans tend to make the same
kind of mistake; therefore a large group of American answers contains only slightly more
information than a single American opinion.
When the American (Thai) group bias share is greater than zero, optimal behavior implies
that a subject puts a lower weight on any one piece of American (Thai) information when
she observes more American (Thai) answers. Note that an optimizing Thai subject puts
lower weight on an observed Thai answer even when she observes only one Thai answer. As
a Thai individual, she shares the same group bias with the observed Thai.
3.2 A model of subject behavior
Described here is a model of how the Thai subjects treat the information they observe.
Previous research suggests that a Thai subject may not treat an observed Thai answer in
11the same way as her own answer. When problems are di¢ cult, individuals have shown
overcon￿dence in a wide variety of environments (Gri¢ n and Tversky (1992), Keren (1987),
Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). To account for this idea, a subject￿ s own perceived MSE is
modeled as a fraction c of another Thai￿ s. Where ￿2







and overcon￿dence implies c < 1. A standard way to measure overcon￿dence involves
comparing a subject￿ s con￿dence interval for a given quantity to what it should be (Cesarini,
Sandewall, and Johanneson (2003)). Consider as an example a weather forecaster who has
to choose a 95% con￿dence interval for tomorrow￿ s temperature. An overcon￿dent forecaster
will choose a con￿dence interval for tomorrow￿ s temperature that is smaller than it should
be. The actual temperature will be outside her con￿dence interval more than 5% of the
time. The modeling of overcon￿dence in equation (1) corresponds to this idea. A subject
perceives her con￿dence interval to be c times the width of another Thai￿ s, for any given
signi￿cance level. It is also assumed that a subject perceives her squared bias to be the
same fraction c of another Thai￿ s squared bias.
A subject who minimizes the expected MSE of her ￿nal answer will weigh information
according to her perceptions of how good Americans are relative to Thais at answering the




A, ￿T, and ￿A determine her behavior. The actual values of the parameters determine what
she would optimally do.
De￿ne yiq to be the ￿nal answer that individual i gives after observing information about
question q. For the case where subjects see nA American answers (xAq;1 through xAq;nA)
and nT Thai answers (xTq;1 through xTq;nT), a subject￿ s objective function is:
E(MSE) = E(yiq ￿ Truthq)
2
E (￿T(xTq;1 + ::: + xTq;nT) + ￿A(xAq;1 + ::: + xAq;nA) + ￿sxiq ￿ Truthq)
2(2)
12where
￿s = weight for own information
￿T = weight for any one piece of Thai information
￿A = weight for any one piece of American information
Assuming independence between the American and Thai group biases and that the
weights given to all information sum to one, the expressions in Proposition 2 below cap-
ture the weights that subjects would optimally use.4 The expressions below de￿ne optimal
behavior conditional on any level of overcon￿dence. To fully minimize MSE, subjects should
also avoid overcon￿dence, choosing c = 1.
Proposition 3 The following expressions de￿ne the MSE-minimizing weights that subjects
should use to evaluate information:










































1 + (nT ￿ 1)￿T ￿ c￿2
TnT
(1 + (nA ￿ 1)￿A)(1 ￿ ￿T)
￿
(5)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
The same equations de￿ne the actual weights that subjects use under the model, with
the actual parameter values substituted by subjects￿perceptions of these parameters.
Equation (3) is the ratio of the self-weight to the weight for other Thais and thus the
accuracy of Thais does not matter. But group bias does matter. When ￿T is high and subjects
4This model implies that a subject behaves in a similar way as a Bayesian would. Other experimental
evidence, such as Larrick and Soll (2003), indicates that cognitive failures may cause subjects to deviate from
Bayesian rationality when they have to aggregate opinions. More general models of how Bayesians would
behave when aggregating opinions can be found in Genest and Schervish (1985), West and Crosse (1992),
and West (1992).
13are overcon￿dent, the weight that subjects put on other Thais becomes small. When the
group e⁄ect accounts for more of total MSE, an overcon￿dent subject puts more trust in her
reading of the joint Thai information than in another Thai￿ s. If c = 1, the subject is not
overcon￿dent and she puts equal weight on herself and any other Thai.
Equation (4) is the ratio of the self-weight to the weight subjects should put on observed
Americans when nT = 0. Subjects should put more weight on Americans when Americans




T value. When c is low, subjects
put less weight on American answers, since subjects perceive themselves to be better at
answering the question. When ￿A is high, subjects treat each additional American answer
after the ￿rst as providing little added value. Dividing each side by nA gives the optimal
















This equation shows more clearly that when ￿A is high, subjects should put less weight on
each American answer when they observe more of them.
Equation (5) gives the weight ratio that subjects should assign to an American answer
relative to an observed Thai answer. Not surprisingly, subjects should put higher weight on
American information when ￿2
A is low relative to ￿2
T. Also when ￿A is low and ￿T is high,
subjects should put higher relative weight on American information.
The overcon￿dence parameter enters the expression in a second-order way through the
c￿2
TnT term. For reasonable values of ￿T, overcon￿dence has a small, but noticeable, e⁄ect
on the relative weight ratio that subjects should use for American versus Thai information.
When overcon￿dence is high (c is lower), subjects put more relative weight on Americans
because an overcon￿dent subject trusts her perception of the common Thai information for
a given question more than another Thai￿ s perception. Another way to think of this idea is
that overcon￿dent subjects already put high weight on Thai information through the high
weight they give to themselves. A Thai who is overcon￿dent but otherwise rational will then
put higher weight on observed Americans than on observed Thais.
14Notice also that increases in ￿A only cause subjects to put less weight on individual
American answers when nA is greater than one, but increases in ￿T cause subjects to put
less weight on observed Thais even when only one Thai is observed. When one Thai is
observed, there are two Thai answers to consider: a subject￿ s own answer and the one she
observes. As a result, the Thai group bias term enters (5) when nT = 1, but the American
group bias term does not when nA = 1.
The experimental data on how subjects update their answers provide estimates of the





A, ￿T, and ￿A, the following sections show how the estimated weights that
subjects use make it possible to test a variety of hypotheses relating to subjects￿implicit
perceptions.
3.3 A check on the optimal weights
To supplement the model in the previous section, I also estimate the optimal weights that
subjects should use by regressing the correct answer to the questions on a subject￿ s initial
answer, the average of the American answers she observes, and the average of the Thai
answers she observes. The regression by de￿nition minimizes the MSE. Checking how
closely these estimates of the optimal weights match the model￿ s estimates provides a test
of the model￿ s applicability. The model￿ s usefulness derives from making it possible to
separately analyze the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence on subject behavior.
Included in the regression are question dummies for the three categories of questions:
meteorology, economics/politics, and social/cultural questions. I run the regressions sepa-
rately for the cases where subjects observe information for the Bangkok/Thailand questions,
the Boston/US questions, and the sum questions. To run the regression that estimates
optimal behavior, I ￿rst standardize the data to make it possible to compare answers across
questions. The data appendix, Appendix A.3, describes how I standardize the data.
15Where
Truthq = (standardized) correct answer for question q,
xiq = (standardized) initial answer given by subject i for question q,
xiAq = (standardized) average observed American answer for question q,
xiTq = (standardized) average observed Thai answer for question q,
Cq = vector of dummy variables for question category for question q,
the regression equation is
Truthq = ￿sxiq + ￿AxiAq + ￿TxiTq + C
0
q￿q + "iq (6)
Relying only on a linearity assumption, this regression estimates the average weights
that subjects should use to minimize their mean-squared error. I discuss the results from
estimating (6) in Section 5. As described there, I also include terms that account for
the number of American and Thai answers that a subject observes and di⁄erent relative
American-to-Thai accuracy for di⁄erent questions. To estimate how subjects actually weigh
information, I replace Truthq in (6) with the subjects￿￿nal answers to the questions.
4 Summary Statistics
The data shows that, across questions, Thais tend to make one kind of mistake and Americans
make their own kind of mistake. This group bias means that American information contains
extra value for a Thai subject. As an example of what the data looks like, Figure 3 shows
kernel density estimates for the Thai and American answers for the questions about January
temperature in Bangkok and Boston. Panel 1 shows that Americans have a mean of 20￿C for
the Bangkok temperature (truth=32￿C) and Panel 2 shows that Thais have a mean answer
of 20￿C for the Boston January temperature (truth=2￿C).
16Notes:
(1) Epanechnikov kernel estimates
with optimal bandwidth selection
(2) Vertical lines correspond to
the correct answers
Figure 3:  Kernel density estimates for American and Thai answers about January temperature
Panel 1:  January temperature in Bangkok
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Panel 2:  January temperature in Boston
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Panel 3:  Sum of January temperatures
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Across questions, the data provides estimates of the average Thai-to-American MSE





meaning that the expected squared distance between a randomly selected Thai answer and
the truth is 0:517 times the expected squared distance between a randomly selected American
answer and the truth. Table 1 summarizes the relative Thai-to-American accuracy for each
of the three question types. The estimates in Table 1 come from the 116 Americans and the
430 Thais who either never observed anyone else￿ s answers or who answered the questions
before observing other subjects￿opinions.5
5Thai subjects were informed that the answers they observed came from MIT students and Thammasat-
Rangsit students. So if subjects had di⁄erent perceptions about Thammasat-Rangsit than the universe of
all Thai subjects in the experiment, it would be appropriate to use only the 130 Thai students from Stage
1 to calculate variances and correlations. Limiting the calculations to the Stage 1 students has little e⁄ect
on the estimated variances and correlations.
17Question type
(1) (2)
Type 1 (Questions about Thailand) .341 .517
(.008) (.018)
Type 2 (Questions about US) .755 3.086
(.013) (.216)
Type 3 (Questions about the sum) .565 1.299
(.01) (.052)
Table 1: Relative accuracy of Americans and Thais
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses




Consider the second column in Table 1. Thais have about one-half the MSE of Americans
for the Thai questions. Americans are three times more accurate for the questions about
the US, and about 1:3 times more accurate for the sum questions. Note that these ratios
exactly describe the weights that a subject should use if group bias did not matter. In that
case, a subject should put 1:3 times more weight on any observed American answer than she
puts on any Thai answer. The data will show that group bias means that a subject should
actually put about 2:2 times more weight on American answers than on Thai answers.
The experimental design also enables me to estimate the share of group bias in total MSE
for each question type, both for Americans and for Thais. Table 2 displays the estimated
group bias shares for each question type.
18Estimated Thai Estimated American
Question type group bias share group bias share
(1) (2)
Type 1 (Questions about Thailand) .234 .307
(.066) (.056)
Type 2 (Questions about US) .362 .227
(.088) (.063)
Type 3 (Questions about the sum) .336 .277
(.081) (.062)
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: Group effects for Americans and for Thais
Table 2 shows that each group￿ s bias share is higher for the question types that the group
knows less well. For Thais, group bias is responsible for the smallest share, 23%, of total MSE
for the Bangkok/Thailand questions and the largest share, 36%, for the Boston/US questions.
In contrast, the group e⁄ect is responsible for the smallest share of total American MSE for
the Boston/US questions and the largest share for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. For
example, Thais make small errors about the average high daily January Bangkok temperature
and the group e⁄ect causes a small share of that error. On the other hand, Thais make much
larger errors for the January Boston temperature, and a larger share of their mistakes comes
from the fact that the group mean for Thais is 20￿C. As I show in Section 6, the fact
that ￿T is biggest for the Boston/US questions and ￿A is biggest for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions has important implications for how a subject would optimally behave when she
sees information for the sum question only.
In summary, the answer distributions show signi￿cant group biases for both Americans
and Thais. American answers thus have extra value to a Thai due to the independence of
observed American answers compared to observed Thai answers from her perspective. An
optimizing Thai subject needs to account for group bias when deciding how to weigh the
American opinions she observes compared to the Thai opinions she observes.
195 Estimating subject behavior
5.1 Regression estimates
A simple regression provides the weights that subjects give to the information they observe
and to their own private beliefs. This involves regressing subjects￿￿nal answers after observ-
ing information on the initial answers they gave before observing information, the American
answers they observe, and the Thai answers they observe. If subjects increase (decrease)
their answers more in response to high (low) observed American answers than to high (low)
observed Thai answers, the regression will estimate that subjects assign a higher weight to
the American answers.
The following regression estimates the average weights that a subject puts on American
answers (￿A), other Thai answers (￿T), and her own initial answer (￿s). Where
yiq = (standardized) ￿nal answer given by subject i for question q,
xiq = (standardized) initial answer given by subject i for question q,
xiAq = (standardized) average observed American answer for question q,
xiTq = (standardized) average observed Thai answer for question q,
Cq = vector of dummy variables for question category for question q,
I estimate the following regression equation:
yiq = ￿sxiq + ￿AxiAq + ￿TxiTq + C
0
q￿q + "iq (7)
Optimal behavior implies that a subject chooses di⁄erent weights for the American and
Thai average when she observes di⁄erent amounts, niA and niT, of observed American and
Thai information. When a subject observes more American answers, a higher weight should
be assigned to the American average since it contains more information. A high ￿A, though,
means that there is less new information in each additional American answer and that a
subject should put less weight on each individual American answer when she sees more
20of them. To see how subjects actually do change the weights they give to information
depending on how much they observe, I include terms to account for this in the regression.
In addition, if subjects have some knowledge of the group MSEs for individual questions,
they will apply higher weight to American information for those questions where it is rela-
tively better. To see if subjects behave this way, the regression can be expanded to include





Aq + b ￿2
Tq
. (8)
When Accq is high, Americans are better relative to Thais for the question q.6
The full regression allows the weights that a subject uses to vary with how much American
and Thai information she sees and also on the question that the subject is answering:
￿s = ￿s;1 + ￿s;2niA + ￿s;3niT + ￿s;4Accq
￿A = ￿A;1 + ￿A;2niA + ￿A;3niT + ￿A;4Accq
￿T = ￿T;1 + ￿T;2niA + ￿T;3niT + ￿T;4Accq
For example, the regression that includes terms involving the number of observed American
answers is:
yiq = ￿s;1xiq + ￿s;2niAxiq + ￿A;1xiAq + ￿A;2niAxiAq + ￿T;1xiTq + ￿T;2niAxiTq + Q
0￿q + "iq (9)
Estimating these regressions gives the average weights that subjects put on Thai answers,
American answers, and their own initial answers for each question type. Table 3 describes
subject behavior for the Bangkok/Thailand questions.
6Subjects may also want to account for the spread in the answers they observe. For example, when a
subject sees two answers that are near each other and one answer that is extreme, she may ignore the extreme
answer, deeming it irrelevant. To look at this, I expand the regression to include a term that captures the
spread in the observed answers. The spread is measured simply as the standard deviation in the observed
information. Inclusion or exclusion of terms involving the standard deviation of observed information does
not a⁄ect the results.
21Dependent variable:  Subjects' final answers for the Thailand questions
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject's initial answer (bs,1) .653 .654 .65 .662
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.018)
Initial answer i number of observed .002 .008 .004
         American answers (bs,2) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Initial answer inumber of observed -.038 -.04
         Thai answers (bs,3) (.019) (.019)
Initial answer iaccuracy index (bs,4) -.142
(.084)
Thai average (bT,1) .238 .242 .242 .24
(.02) (.021) (.025) (.026)
Thai average i number of observed .004 .002 .012
         American answers (bT,2) (.024) (.024) (.025)
Thai average inumber of observed .001 -.002
         Thai answers (bT,3) (.025) (.026)
Thai average iaccuracy index (bT,4) .04
(.098)
American average (bA,1) .056 .049 .039 .063
(.012) (.014) (.015) (.016)
American average i number of observed -.016 0 -.003
         American answers (bA,2) (.017) (.019) (.019)
American average inumber of observed -.036 -.027
         Thai answers (bA,3) (.018) (.018)
American average iaccuracy index (bA,4) .232
(.055)
Number of observations 1008 986 986 986
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
      saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
      (meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
Table 3:  Estimated weights for the Thailand questions
22Consider the ￿rst column of Table 3. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects put a
weight of 0:653 on their private beliefs, 0:238 on the observed Thai average, and 0:056 on the
observed American average. Thus, the model estimates that subjects assign 4:2 times more
weight to the observed Thai answers than to American answers for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions.
The complete regression results for the Boston/US and sum questions appear in Table
A1 in Appendix A.4.7 Table 4 captures the primary results for all three types of questions.
Actual weight Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Own initial answer .653 .464 .731
(.016) (.02) (.019)
Thai average .238 .09 .068
(.02) (.03) (.02)
US average .056 .463 .165
(.012) (.019) (.024)
N 1008 1053 557
Note:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the regressions in column 1 in Tables 3, A1, and A2.
Table 4:  Summary of estimated weights
When subjects observe information about the Boston/US questions, they assign approx-
imately 5:1 times more weight to American answers than to other Thai answers, choosing
7I include the cases where individuals see answers for all three types of questions in the regressions for
the Thailand and US questions. One possibility is that there are spillovers across question types when
subjects observe all answers for all three types of questions. For example, a subject who sees an American
who answers well for the Thailand question may put more weight on that American for the US question.
Testing for this possibility generally produces insigni￿cant results. Details are available upon request.
230:464 as the weight for their initial answers, 0:090 for the weight given to observed Thai
answers, and 0:463 for the weight given to observed American answers. When subjects
observe answers for the sum question, the regression estimates that they assign 2:4 times
more weight to American answers than to observed Thai answers, giving estimates of 0:731
for the own-weight, 0:068 for the Thai weight, and 0:165 for the American weight.
Table 3 and Table A1 indicate that subjects account for di⁄erent group accuracies across
questions. For all three types of questions, subjects put signi￿cantly more weight on Ameri-
can information for those questions on which Americans perform relatively better. For the
Bangkok/Thailand questions, as seen in Table 3, an increase of 0:1 in the accuracy index
(Thai MSE divided by the sum of American and Thai MSE) increases the weight given
to American answers by 0:02. Given that subjects assign a weight of 0:058 to American
answers, this represents a substantial increase.
It may seem surprising that subjects are able to appreciate the accuracy of Americans
relative to Thais for individual questions. That they do is perhaps less surprising when the
individual questions are considered. Relative to American answers, Thai answers are much
more accurate for the question about temperature in Bangkok than for the question about
female-labor force participation in Thailand. It seems reasonable to expect that the subjects
would understand that it takes individual experience in Bangkok to know the weather there,
but there may be more general knowledge involved with making an educated guess about
labor-force demographics. Therefore, the Thai subjects may and apparently do put higher
relative weight on Thai information for the question about Bangkok weather.
5.2 Anchoring
As discussed earlier, anchoring presents a major concern in this experiment. Subjects may
adhere more closely to their initial answers because they express them. To test for this,
a treatment group of 42 students observed randomly selected answers from Americans and
Thais without ￿rst providing their private beliefs about the answers to the questions. These
24subjects observe one of the same twenty sets of information that the subjects in the main
group observe. By comparing subjects in the anchoring group to subjects in the main
group who see the same information, I can test for anchoring. If subjects anchor to their
private signals when they reveal them, the subjects who do not reveal their private signals
will choose ￿nal answers closer to the answers they observe.8
To test for anchoring, I consider the following regressions:
(yiq ￿ xiTq)
2 = ￿1TAnchori + V ersion
0
iv￿2T + "iq (10)
(yiq ￿ xiAq)
2 = ￿1AAnchori + V ersion
0
iv￿2A + "iq, (11)
where Anchori is a dummy that is one if the subject belongs to the anchoring treatment
group and zero otherwise. V ersioniv is a dummy that is one if subject i observed version v
out of the 20 possible sets of randomly selected information. Including the version dummies
creates a direct comparison between subjects in the anchoring group and subjects in the
main group who observed the same information.
The ￿rst (second) regression looks at the distance between subjects￿￿nal answers and
the Thai (American) answers they observe. If subjects in the main group anchor, then
the following two conditions should hold: ￿1T < 0 and ￿1A < 0. Table 5 shows that the
coe¢ cients are always close to zero and insigni￿cant except for the distance between subjects￿
answers and the American average they see for the Boston/US questions.
The ￿rst three entries in column (1) of Table 5 come from running regression (10) for each
of the three types of questions and the last three entries in column (1) come from running
(11) for each of the three types of questions. The results indicate, for the questions about
Thailand, that the squared distance between subjects￿￿nal answers and the Thai average
they observe is :013 units lower for subjects in the anchoring group than for subjects in the
main group.
8Another way to test for anchoring involves looking at whether or not subjects in the anchoring group
do better at answering the questions than the students in the main group because these 42 students do not
su⁄er the losses associated with anchoring. On average, subjects in the anchoring treatment group appear
to do slightly better, but the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant.
25To put the regression coe¢ cients into perspective, column (2) in Table 5 shows the average
mean-squared distance from of subjects￿￿nal answers from the observed Thai or American
average for the 300 subjects who were not in the anchoring group. Since the data has been
standardized, the standard deviation for each question is one. The table indicates that, on
average, subjects in the main group choose ￿nal answers that are 1:835 standard deviations
from the observed Thai average for the US question. The regression estimates that the
students in the anchoring group choose ￿nal answers that are :051 standard deviations closer
to the observed Thai average than the main group. In other words, compared to subjects
in the main group, subjects who do not have the chance to anchor choose ￿nal answers that
are about :051
1:835 = 3% closer in squared distance to the observed Thai average. In general,
the results in Table 5 follow this pattern. Anchoring has a small and usually insigni￿cant
e⁄ect on subject behavior.
Independent variable: Dummy for anchoring treatment group
Effect of not having
a chance to anchor
Average squared
distance for subjects
not in the anchoring
group
(1) (2)
A. Dependent variable: Squared distance
from average of observed Thai answers
Questions about Thailand -.013 .827
(.021) (1.773)
Questions about the US -.051 1.798
(.065) (3.23)
Questions about sum -.026 1.75
(.049) (3.585)
B. Dependent variable: Squared distance
from average of observed American answers
Questions about Thailand .042 1.716
(.078) (2.571)
Questions about the US -.046 1.378
(.022) (2.945)
Questions about sum -.049 1.781
(.07) (3.314)
Note:
For column (1), the robust regression standard errors are reported in parentheses.
For column (2), the standard deviation is in parentheses.
Table 5:  Effect of anchoring on distance from observed information
266 Tests for optimal behavior
6.1 Estimated optimal weights
Regressing subjects￿￿nal answers on their initial answers, the average American answer they
observe, and the average Thai answer they observe gives estimates of the optimal weights
subjects should use. Table A2 in Appendix A.4 shows in detail the optimal weights obtained
in this way for all three types of questions. Table 6A summarizes the main results.
A.  Estimates from regression with the correct answers as the dependent variable
Optimal weight Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3)
Own initial answer .292 .063 .179
(.021) (.017) (.026)
Thai average .458 .115 .250
(.023) (.02) (.024)
American average .250 .822 .571
(.018) (.016) (.026)
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the regressions in column 1, 5, and 9 in Table A2.
B.  Estimates from the econometric model
Optimal weight Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
(1) (2) (3)
Own initial answer .258 .100 .154
(.007) (.008) (.009)
Thai average .458 .174 .332
(.014) (.015) (.02)
American average .284 .726 .514
(.021) (.024) (.028)
Notes:
(1) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) These estimates come from the parameter estimates described in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 6:  Estimating the optimal weights
For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, an optimally-behaving subject would put a weight
of 0:292 on her private belief, a weight of 0:458 on the observed Thai average, and a weight
27of 0:250 on the observed American average. For the Boston/US questions, subjects would
optimally choose a weight of 0:063 for their initial answers, 0:115 for the observed Thai
average, and 0:822 for the observed American average. For the sum questions, the regression
estimates that a subject should choose 0:179 for the self weight, 0:250 for the weight given to
observed Thai answers, and 0:571 for the weight given to observed American answers. Notice
that these regression estimates of optimal behavior do not account for overcon￿dence. These
are the weights that a subject should use assuming overcon￿dence is not present.
The model described in Section 3 provides a di⁄erent way to estimate the optimal weights
that a subject should use. These estimates come from substituting the estimates of the
American-to-Thai MSE ratio, the American group bias share, and the Thai group bias share
into equations (3) and (5). I reported these estimates in Tables 1 and 2. Table 6B displays
the econometric model￿ s estimates of the optimal weights subjects should apply given that
subjects do not show overcon￿dence.
For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, a subject should apply a weight of 0:258 to her
initial answer, 0:459 to the Thai average she observes, and 0:284 to the American average
she observes. For the Boston/US questions, the corresponding weights are 0:100, 0:174, and
0:726. For the sum questions, the model estimates that a subject would optimally choose
0:154 for the self-weight, 0:332 for the weight given to observed Thai answers, and 0:514 for
the weight given to observed American answers. Bootstrapping gives the standard errors
for these estimates.
For all three types of questions, the regression￿ s estimates of the optimal weights in Table
6A and the econometric model￿ s estimates in Table 6B match closely and equality cannot be
rejected. The close correspondence between the estimates in Table 6A and those in Table
6B provides additional evidence supporting the importance of accounting for group bias in
determining optimal behavior. If, in the model, the group bias shares ￿A and ￿T are assumed
to be zero, the hypothesis of equality between the two sets of estimates of optimal behavior
is rejected for all three types of questions.
286.2 Construction of con￿dence intervals
Simulations using the regression coe¢ cients from (7) give the con￿dence interval for
￿A
￿T , the
weight ratio that subjects use to relatively weigh observed American and Thai information.
The distributions of Thai and American answers generate con￿dence intervals for functions
of Thai and American MSE and the Thai and American group biases. I focus on two
such con￿dence intervals: 1) the naive weight ratio, which expresses the relative weight a
subject would use if she understood each group￿ s accuracy but ignored group bias, and 2)
the optimal weight ratio discussed in Section 3, which expresses how a subject would behave
if she correctly perceived each group￿ s accuracy and accounted for group bias.


















1 + (nT ￿ 1)￿T ￿ c￿2
TnT
(1 + (nA ￿ 1)￿A)(1 ￿ ￿T)
￿
Using the parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2, I calculate the con￿dence intervals for
the optimal weight ratios for a variety of di⁄erent values of the overcon￿dence parameter c.
Table 7 reports these results for each of the three question types. The p-values in the table
correspond to tests that I describe in the next subsection.
29Thailand questions US questions Sum questions
(1) (2) (3)
Actual weight ratio .231 5.143 2.49
95% confidence interval (.131,.352) (3.144,15.17) (1.45,5.366)
Naive weight ratio .517 3.086 1.299
(.477,.554) (2.737,3.577) (1.205,1.406)
p=0.000 p=0.065 p=0.017
Optimal weight ratios for
different overconfidence levels
   c = 1 .571 4.423 1.843
(.475,.694) (3.467,5.63) (1.466,2.332)
p=0.000 p=0.622 p=0.346
   c = 0.75 .576 4.581 1.913
(.464,.727) (3.504,6.29) (1.469,2.524)
p=0.000 p=0.732 p=0.423
   c = 0.5 .606 4.897 2.048
(.476,.759) (3.62,6.938) (1.549,2.877)
p=0.000 p=0.879 p=0.572
   c = 0.25 .616 5.125 2.135
(.468,.798) (3.662,7.592) (1.525,2.991)
p=0.000 p=0.986 p=0.676
   Estimated c(n A + n T) .603 5.043 2.168
(.476,.773) (3.635,7.345) (1.597,3.136)
p=0.000 p=0.979 p=0.75
Notes:  (1) Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.
(2)  The bootstrap for the actual weights accounts for correlation in the coefficient estimates.
(3) p-values compare the given weight ratio to the actual weight ratio.
Table 7:  Comparing how subjects relatively weigh American and Thai information
The optimal weight ratio increases as overcon￿dence increases. As discussed earlier,
an overcon￿dent subject already puts high weight on Thai information by assigning a high
weight to her own beliefs. As a result, conditional on her overcon￿dence, an optimizing
subject will put more weight on observed Americans relative to observed Thais. Even for
very large overcon￿dence (small c), though, the direct e⁄ect of group bias on the optimal
weight ratio is larger than the e⁄ect of overcon￿dence. Consider the Boston/US questions.
With no overcon￿dence (c = 1), the presence of group bias causes the optimal weight ratio
to increase from 3:09 to 4:42. Increasing overcon￿dence by lowering c to 0:25 causes the
optimal weight ratio to further rise to 5:13.
30The data can also be used to estimate the overcon￿dence parameter with some additional
assumptions.9 I use the estimated c values only for illustrative purposes in the calculation
shown in Table 7. As the table re￿ ects, estimated overcon￿dence puts the estimated c in
the range between 0:25 and 0:5, on average.
To summarize, the data on how subjects use the information they observe to update
their answers give con￿dence intervals for the ratio that subjects use to weigh observed
American information relative to observed Thai information. The Thai and American
answer distributions for the series of questions gives con￿dence intervals for the optimal
weight ratio that subjects should apply. The data provides these optimal estimates for any
value of the overcon￿dence parameter.
6.3 Testing behavioral hypotheses
By looking at how subjects revise their answers, I can test a variety of hypotheses relating
to subjects￿perceptions about the relative accuracy and group biases of Americans and
Thais. The weights that subjects apply to the information they observe re￿ ect their implicit
perceptions of these parameters. To start, consider the hypothesis that subjects correctly
perceive the MSE of Thais relative to Americans, but ignore group bias. Call this the naive
















, (￿T)perceived = 0, (￿A)perceived = 0 .











9This process involves estimating a non-linear model. Speci￿cally, for each of the question types, if it is
assumed that ￿A = ￿T and c is allowed to be a function of niA + niT, then the overcon￿dence parameters
c(niA + niT) can be estimated. The standard error bounds for the overcon￿dence estimates are large.
Estimated overcon￿dence generally increases when more information is observed, but it appears for any
amount. Details and regression results are available upon request.
31Rejection of the prediction (12) implies rejection of N0.
The second row of Table 7 displays the results of this test for all three types of questions.
For the Bangkok/Thailand questions and the sum questions, we can reject this hypothesis
at the 5% level (p = 0 and p = 0:017, respectively). For the Boston/US questions, we can
reject it at the 10% level (p = 0:065). We reject the hypothesis for the Bangkok questions
due to subjects choosing too low a weight for American answers relative to Thai answers.
It is rejected for the Boston/US and sum questions due to subjects relatively overweighing
American answers. For all three types of questions, subjects do not correctly perceive how
accurate Americans are relative to Thais while at the same time failing to recognize the
presence of group bias.
















, (￿T)perceived = ￿T, (￿A)perceived = ￿A
This hypothesis states that subjects correctly perceive the MSE of Thais relative to Ameri-
cans and also correctly account for group bias. Under S0, subjects understand each group￿ s
accuracy and correctly value the independence in American information. Compared to a
subject who behaves according to N0; a subject who behaves according to S0 will put more
weight on American answers because she appreciates the value of an American￿ s independent
perspective.
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(13)
Table 7 displays the results of the above test for a variety of possible values of the overcon-
￿dence parameter. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, S0 is rejected. For all values of
overcon￿dence, the test gives a p-value of nearly zero. Thais put too little weight on Amer-
ican answers in this case. On the other hand, for the Boston/US and sum questions, we
cannot reject this hypothesis for any level of overcon￿dence. For c = 1, the optimal weight
ratio estimates are 4:42 and 1:84, compared to the actual weight ratio estimates of 5:14 and
2:49. Tests of equality give p-values of 0:622 and 0:346, respectively.
32Now consider the optimal weight ratios for the Boston/US and sum questions when
overcon￿dence is taken into account. Given estimated overcon￿dence, the actual and optimal
weight ratios match up remarkably closely in these two cases. For the Boston/US questions,
the optimal weight ratio estimate is 5:04 and the actual weight ratio estimate is 5:14. The
test for equality between the two, not surprisingly, gives a p-value of nearly one (p = 0:979).
For the sum questions, the actual weight ratio estimate is 2:49, compared to the optimal
estimate of 2:17. The test for equality gives a p-value of 0:750. In summary, individuals
who display the same amount of overcon￿dence as the subjects in the experiment would
optimally choose a weight ratio very close to the one that the experimental subjects actually
use.
Biased behavior, however, could still explain subject behavior for the Boston/US and
sum questions. Under this hypothesis, B0, subjects perceive Americans to be better than
















, (￿T)perceived = 0, (￿A)perceived = 0
Under S0, subjects put extra weight on American information because they understand the
extra value in American information that comes fromthe fact that Americans and Thais make
di⁄erent kinds of mistakes. Under B0, subjects put extra weight on American information
because subjects incorrectly perceive American answers to be better than they really are.
The experimental design can distinguish between S0 and B0. Subject behavior on the








. By looking at how subjects who observe answers only for the sum
question update their answers for both the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions, it
is possible to test the hypothesis that subjects ignore group bias when choosing their ￿nal
answers.
To explain this test, I expand the earlier notation that applied when each question type
33was considered separately. De￿ne
￿jk = group bias share in total MSE for group j for question type k
￿
2
jk = mean-squared error for group j for question type k .
For example, ￿Ta is the group bias share in total MSE for Thais for the Boston/US questions.
Consider the case when a subject uses observed answers for the sum question to up-
date her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand questions. A subject updates her answer for a
Bangkok/Thailand question based on her initial answer for a Bangkok/Thailand question
and the distance between the answers she observes for the sum question and her initial an-
swer for the sum question. When a subject observes answers above her own for the sum








to be the weight ratio that subjects assign to American answers relative







to be the weight ratio that subjects assign to American answers relative
to Thai answers to the sum question when they update for the Boston/US question. Consider
the following proposition:












Proof. See Appendix A.2.4
Consider the hypothesis, I0, that the perceived group bias shares are zero.
I0 : (￿Tt)perceived = (￿Ta)perceived = 0
This hypothesis states that subjects ignore Thai group bias for Thais for both the Thai
and US questions. Notice that I0 encompasses N0, the hypothesis that subjects perceive
34total MSE correctly and ignore group bias, and B0, the hypothesis that subjects perceive
Americans to have lower MSE relative to Thais than they actually do and ignore group bias.
Rejection of I0 means we must also reject B0.













Rejection of equality between the weight ratio subjects use to relatively weigh answers for
the sum question when they update for the Thai question and the analogous ratio when they
update for the US question would imply rejection of I0.
The following two regressions give the parameter estimates needed to conduct the above
test. The ￿rst equation expresses the change in a subject￿ s answer for the Thai question
(subscript t) as a function of the distance between the average observed American answer
for the sum question and her own answer for the sum question (subscript s) and the distance
between the average observed Thai answer for the sum question and her own answer for the
sum question. The second equation expresses how subjects update their answers for the US
question after observing information relating to the sum question.
Where
yiqt = ￿nal answer given by subject i to the Thai part of question q,
xiqt = initial answer given by subject i to the Thai part of question q,
yiqa = ￿nal answer given by subject i to the US part of question q,
xiqa = initial answer given by subject i to the US part of question q,
xiqs = initial answer given by subject i for the sum part of question q,
the regression equations are:
yiqt ￿ xiqt = ￿A;Thai(xiAqs ￿ xiqs) + ￿T;Thai(xiTqs ￿ xiqs) + C
0
q￿1 + "iqt (15)
yiqa ￿ xiqa = ￿A;US(xiAqs ￿ xiqs) + ￿T;US(xiTqs ￿ xiqs) + C
0
q￿2 + "iqu (16)















:081 = 2:79. The regression results provide the inputs needed to
test (14). We can reject (14), at a 10% level (p = 0:058). At a 10% level, we reject I0, the
hypothesis that subjects fail to take group bias into account, regardless of how they perceive
American and Thai accuracy.
Dependent variables: (1) Final answer for Thai question
(2) Final answer for US question
Regression weights Thailand questions US questions
(1) (2)
      =  Distance between observed Thai average .056 .081
and initial answer (for sum question) (.013) (.019)
      =  Distance between observed American average .075 .226
and initial answer (for sum question) (.014) (.022)
p-value for test of
N 548 544
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) Regressions include dummies for question categories (meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).




















In contrast, correctly accounting for group bias would lead subjects to behave in a way
that accords with how they actually behave. If the perceived group bias share for Thais for
the Boston/US questions (￿Ta) is greater than the perceived group bias share for Thais for
the Bangkok/Thailand questions (￿Tt), then subjects will put a higher relative weight on
observed Americans for the US questions than for the Thailand questions. The proof of
Proposition 4 demonstrates that:












36To understand the intuition, consider a subject updating her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand
question after observing answers for the sum question. If ￿Tt is high, she should put less
weight on Thais relative to Americans for the same reasons seen earlier; group bias means
each additional Thai answer contains less new information. On the other hand, if ￿Ta is
high, she should put higher weight on observed Thai answers for the sum question. When
￿Ta is high, Thai subjects have a better idea of what other Thai answers about the sum
mean for what those observed students believe about the Thai question. For example, if
￿Ta were equal to one, all Thais would give the same answer to the US questions. Then, a
subject could deduce the observed individual￿ s private belief about the Thai question from
her answer to the sum question.
The data shows that the e⁄ects of group bias can explain how subjects actually weigh the
information they observe. If subjects applied the estimated actual variance estimates and













Figure 4 shows how the optimal weight ratios for the two types of questions vary as a function
of ￿Ta, holding the other parameters constant at their estimated values. The graph shows
that, when updating their answers for the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects should put
less weight on observed Americans answers to the sum question and more weight on observed
Thai answers when ￿Ta is high.
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37In summary, the earlier results showed that subjects used approximately the optimal
weight ratio for the Boston/US and sum questions. We could explain this behavior in two





the ratio of Thai MSE to American MSE. By looking at how subjects update separately for
the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions when they observe answers for the sum,
we can reject the latter possibility. The hypothesis left standing, that subjects appreciate
each group￿ s accuracy and the extra value in an American￿ s independent perspective to a
Thai subject, describes the data quite closely.
7 Potential gains from changing behavior
Earlier results indicated that subjects choose a much larger weight for their initial answers
than they optimally would. Here, I show directly how much subjects could reduce their
MSE by: 1) changing how they weigh their initial answers, and 2) changing how they weigh
observed American answers relative to observed Thai answers. The methods described below
apply to the cases where subjects observe direct information; they observe information for
either the Bangkok/Thailand question or the Boston/US question that they can use to
update their answers for either the Bangkok/Thailand question or the Boston/US question.
Similar logic applies for the case where subjects observe information for the sum question.10
Details are in the data appendix, Appendix A.3.
10When subjects observe answers for the sum question only, subjects update their answers for both the
Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions. This means that a subject has more uncertainty about the
answers she sees; she does not see direct information about the answers she changes. As a result, it is
not correct to compare estimates of ￿s from (7) to optimal estimates based on the assumption that subjects
update speci￿cally for the sum question. Optimizing behavior in terms of choosing
￿A
￿T (for the sum question),
though, is the same whether updating occurs directly for the sum question or the observed answers to the
sum question are used to update for the Bangkok/Thailand and Boston/US questions. In other words, when




38The ￿rst column in Table 9 shows the MSE that subjects actually attain with their ￿nal
answers yiq, relative to the MSE they would attain by applying the optimal weights. The
optimal MSE comes from regressing the correct answer on the initial answer, the observed
American average and the observed Thai average.
Truthq = ￿sxiq + ￿AxiAq + ￿TxiTq + "iq
The estimated optimal MSE is the mean squared distance between Truthq and b ￿sxiq +
b ￿AxiAq + b ￿TxiTq. The ￿rst column in Table 9 gives the ratio of the MSE associated with
subjects￿actual answers yiq to the MSE associated with the optimal weights.
Efficiency measure =
MSE that subjects actually attain
(1) (2) (3)
Subjects see direct information and update for:
Questions about Thailand 1.641 1.393 1.043
Questions about US 2.656 1.816 1.012
Subjects see answers for sum question and update for:
Questions about Thailand 1.492 1.400 1.048
Questions about US 1.701 1.539 1.001
Own weight (bS)restricted to estimated value Y N
American-to-Thai weight ratio (bA/ bT) Y Y
restricted to its estimated value
Note:
The weights are constrained to sum to one in all cases, with each weight restricted to being greater than or equal to zero.
Table 9:  Possible improvements in MSE
MSE attainable under different restrictions
attain could subjects MSE ed Unrestrict
attain could subjects MSE Restricted
Now consider the MSE subjects would attain if they used the actual estimated weights
without the variation in the error term. Equation (7) in Section 5.1 gives estimates of the
predicted answer b yiq, where
b yiq = b ￿sxiq + b ￿AxiAq + b ￿TxiTq.
39The second column gives the MSE that subjects would attain by choosing b yiq, relative to the
optimal MSE. Note that the MSE associated with b yiq is smaller than that associated with
subjects actual ￿nal answers, yiq, because b yiq does not contain the variation induced by the
error term.
To estimate the loss that comes from subjects overweighing their initial answers, I use
the regression
Truthq = ’sxiq + ’AxiAq + ’TxiTq + uiq ,






comes from the estimates reported in Table 7. So the
restrictions are ’A = 0:231’T for the Bangkok/Thailand questions and ’A = 5:143’T for
the Boston/US questions.11 This gives the MSE that subjects could achieve if they optimally
chose the weight given to their own initial answers, given the estimated actual relative weights
applied to American and Thai information. I report this relative MSE in the third column
of Table 9. This captures the gains subjects could make by changing the weight they assign
to their own initial answers.
First, compare column 2 to column 1. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects
would achieve 1:393 times the MSE achieved with the optimal weights if they followed the
simple rule of always applying the actual average weights to all information. They actually
achieve an MSE that is 1:641 times greater than the MSE achieved with the optimal weights.
The error term captures the additional MSE. Subjects cannot eliminate this source of MSE
simply by changing the average weight they give to any kind of information.
11Unlike the results for the case when subjects see direct information, these results when subjects see
information for the sum question are sensitive to small variations in the regression restriction. Still, the
￿nding that subjects could achieve most of the possible improvement by changing how they weigh their
initial answers is robust.
40Efficiency measure = % of the total possible MSE reduction a
                            subject could achieve by changing her behavior
Changing relative weight given to
Eliminating overconfidence observed American and Thai answers
(1) (2)
Subjects see direct information and update for:
Questions about Thailand 54.6% 6.7%
Questions about US 48.6% 0.7%
Subjects see answers for sum question and update for:
Questions about Thailand 71.5% 9.8%
Questions about US 76.7% 0.1%
Table 10:  Comparing the possible improvements
Table 10 expresses the gains shown in Table 9 in percentage terms. For example, I
estimate that subjects could reduce their MSE by 54:8% by changing how they weigh their
initial answers for the questions about Thailand. This estimate comes from the fact that
changing the self-weight gives a possible improvement of 1:393 ￿ 1:043 = 0:350 over what
subjects would achieve by using the estimated weights. The total possible improvement
of 1:641 ￿ 1:000 = 0:641 also includes the share of mistakes attributed to the error term.
So subjects could eliminate 0:350
0:641 = 54:6% of their MSE by changing how they weigh their
initial answers. Except for the mistakes caused by the error term, subjects could achieve the
remaining possible improvement by changing how they weigh American information relative
to Thai information. For the Bangkok/Thailand questions, they could eliminate 0:043
0:641 = 6:7%
of their MSE by changing how they relatively weigh observed Americans relative to observed
Thais.
The table shows that, in all four cases, subjects￿potential gains from eliminating over-
con￿dence exceed by at least nine times those from changing how they relatively weigh
Americans compared to Thais. When subjects observe answers for the Bangkok/Thailand
41questions, they can achieve 54:6% of the possible MSE reduction by eliminating overcon￿-
dence, compared to a possible improvement of only 6:7% by changing how they relatively
weigh observed Americans and Thais. For the Boston/US questions, subjects can achieve
a 48:6% improvement by changing how they weigh themselves and a 0:7% improvement by
changing the American-to-Thai weight ratio.
When subjects see answers for the sum question, the results again show that most of
the potential gains come from subjects changing how they weigh their original answers. For
the Bangkok/Thailand questions, subjects can achieve 71:5% of the possible MSE reduction
by eliminating overcon￿dence, compared to a possible improvement of 9:8% from changing
how they relatively weigh observed information. For the Boston/US questions, subjects can
achieve 76:7% of the possible MSE reduction by changing how they weigh themselves and a
0:1% improvement by changing the American-to-Thai weight ratio.
In all cases, subjects could improve their performances signi￿cantly more by decreasing
their overcon￿dence than they could by changing how they relatively weigh observed Ameri-
can and Thai answers. Subjects only deviate signi￿cantly from optimally weighing observed
American information relative to observed Thai information for the questions about Bangkok
and Thailand. For those questions, subjects have relatively little to learn from Americans.
Even in this case, subjects su⁄er a relatively small cost from underweighing Americans and
a much larger cost from overweighing their initial answers.
8 Conclusion
This paper showed that economic agents can learn from information that comes from inside
their country and from outside their country. For questions that do not speci￿cally refer
to Bangkok or Thailand, the experimental subjects apply the optimal relative weights to
the American and Thai information they observe. In achieving this optimal behavior, the
results show that the Thai students appreciate the extra value in American information
42due to its independence. The subjects achieve this success despite displaying considerable
overcon￿dence.
The model presented in this paper may seem to require a level of statistical sophistication
that demands too much of the experimental subjects. Almost certainly, subjects do not
reason along the lines of Bayesian updating, mulling over their beliefs about the American
group bias share in total American MSE. Their actions, however, re￿ ect implicit perceptions.
The experimental design made it possible to test a variety of hypotheses regarding these
perceptions. Left standing is the hypothesis that subject actions re￿ ect an understanding
that American information has extra value to a Thai subject because members of di⁄erent
groups have di⁄erent areas of expertise. A simple understanding of the idea that members
of the same group tend to make the same kind of mistakes would lead subjects to behave as
they do in the experiment.
The experimental results in this paper have important implications for our understanding
of how agents conduct inference. Despite potential biases coming from salient ethnic labels,
the subjects in the experiment treat the information they observe in an intelligent way. If,
for example, people in developing countries appreciate the value of observing independent
sources of information, ensuring access to a variety of information sources might help to
change behaviors a⁄ecting agricultural output and public health. However, the results
suggest that overcon￿dence will present a signi￿cant barrier to individuals appreciating the
value of any information they observe.
It is interesting that the subjects fail to use the optimal relative weights only for the
questions about Bangkok or Thailand. In this case, they overweigh observed Thais compared
to observed Americans. They should put a high weight on observed Thais compared to
observed Americans, but they choose an even higher relative weight than they optimally
would. Future work could investigate whether it is generally the case that agents overweigh
other members of their own group relative to outsiders speci￿cally for tasks that refer to the
group￿ s presumed area of expertise.
43In addition, future research could apply this experiment to American students, to see
if and when they appreciate the value in the independence of Thai or other information.
The experimental results reported here show that the ethnic labels attached to information
generally do not interfere with Thai subjects making optimal decisions in terms of weighing
observed American answers versus observed Thai answers. It would be interesting to see if
we could come to the same conclusion about American students.
Finally, the results in this paper speak to an ongoing debate in behavioral economics.
Does it make sense to model agents who are irrational in one dimension but rational in others,
as behavioral models often do? This paper provides evidence that it may make sense to
do so. The subjects in the experiment display overcon￿dence while otherwise acting in a
strikingly sophisticated way.
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45A Appendix
A.1 Experimental instructions and questionnaire
Below are the instructions given to the subjects in the main group.
A.1.1 Part A instructions
This questionnaire asks a series of questions about Thailand and the United States. Some
of the questions pertain speci￿cally to Bangkok (a city in Thailand) and Boston (a city in
the northeast United States). Your participation on this questionnaire is voluntary. Please
participate only if you desire to do so. You may also choose to stop participating at any
time. For the integrity of the analysis, you are asked to not discuss the questions or your
answers with others at any time.
You will be asked to answer ￿fteen questions about various topics. You will have 15
minutes to complete the questionnaire. You should round each answer to the nearest whole
number or percent, unless otherwise indicated.
Here is a sample question and a possible answer:
Land area of Land area of Sum
Thailand United States
510,000 sq. km. + 3,720,000 sq. km. = 4,230,000 sq. km.
You will ￿ll in your answers in the blank red spaces in the Excel ￿le. When you have
￿nished answering the questions, save the ￿le as ￿A#￿and ￿B#￿ , where # refers to the
questionnaire number on your instruction packet. For example, if you have questionnaire
number A37, save the ￿les as A37 and B37 in the folder ￿Answers.￿After saving, close the
46folder Excel and wait until everyone ￿nishes. When everyone has ￿nished, we will continue
to section 2 of the questionnaire.
You will receive 100 baht for your participation and 20 baht for each of your answers that
are within a range of the correct answer. The size of the range depends on the question￿ s
di¢ culty level. So, if you get 10 answers that are close enough to the right ones, you will get
100 + (10 ￿ 20) = 300 baht.
If you decide to participate, please turn to the next page where there is a brief personal
survey. Your answers to these questions will be kept con￿dential and will have no impact on
your rewards.
A.1.2 Part B instructions
In an earlier phase of this research, approximately 100 introductory economics students at
Thammasat University￿ s Rangsit campus and approximately 100 introductory economics
students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (a university near Boston) answered
the same questionnaire that you just answered. We have randomly selected answers from
those Thai and American students, and attached those answers to this packet. For each
question, you can see answers given by Thai and American students. Please bear in mind
that the American students were asked to answer the questions in units familiar to them
(such as miles), and those answers have been converted into units familiar to you.
Here is a sample question and set of answers:
47Land area of Land area of Sum
Thailand United States
sq. km. + sq. km. = sq. km.
Answers given by Thai students:
1. 20,000 sq. km. 1. 2,000,000 sq. km. 1. 2,020,000 sq. km.
Answers given by American students:
1. 1,000,000 sq. km. 1. 40,000,000 sq. km. 1. 41,000,000 sq. km.
2.  500,000 sq. km. 2. 35,000,000 sq. km. 2. 35,500,000 sq. km.
Please carefully consider the information you observe when choosing your ￿nal answers.
Open the ￿le B# that you previously saved. You will have 15 minutes to choose your
￿nal answers. How you use the information that you observe is entirely up to you. When you
￿nish, please save the ￿le as B# again and close Excel. Your ￿nal answers will determine
the payments that you receive.
48A.1.3 Questionnaire
Questions: Group 1
1)  At the equator, the sun sets 12 hours after it rises on any day.  In other places, the
day is longer than 12 hours in the summer and shorter than 12 hours in the winter.
Length of longest Length of longest Sum
day in Bangkok day in Boston
hours + hours = hours
minutes minutes minutes
2)
In 2002, highest In 2002, highest Sum
recorded temperature recorded temperature
in Bangkok in Boston
°C + °C = °C
3)
From 1961-1990, From 1961-1990, Sum
average number of days average number of days
per year with recordable per year with recordable
precipitation (of any precipitation (of any
type) in Bangkok type) in Boston
days + days = days
4)
From 1961-1990, From 1961-1990, Sum
average daily high average daily high
temperature in January temperature in January
in Bangkok in Boston
°C + °C = °C
5)
Distance between
Bangkok and Boston =
km
49Questions: Group 2
1)  The per capita gross national product (GNP) is a measure of the annual mean
income that is earned per person in a country.  So per capita GNP is the total income
of a country divided by the total number of people in that country
(including adults and children).
In 2002, per capita In 2002, per capita Sum
GNP of Thailand GNP of US
(in Thai baht) (in Thai baht)
baht + baht = baht
2)
2002 population 2002 population Sum
of Thailand of US
million + million = million
3)
Since January 1, 1960, Since January 1, 1960, Sum
number of Thai prime number of US prime
ministers ministers
+ =
4)  Please answer in Thai baht.
On October 1, 2003, On October 1, 2003, Sum
average price of a gallon average price of a gallon
of premium gasoline (95 of premium gasoline (95
octane) in Bangkok octane) in Boston
baht + baht = baht
5)
On October 1, 2003, the
average Thai baht-to-US




In 2002, percentage of In 2002, percentage of Sum
Thai women aged 15-24 US women aged 15-24
infected with HIV infected with HIV
% + % = %
2)
In 2002, percentage of In 2002, percentage of Sum
Thai workers who were US workers who were
women (average for year) women (average for year)
% + % = %
3)
In 2002, percentage of In 2002, percentage of Sum
Thais aged 25-29 Americans aged 25-29
at least least some with at least some
university education university education
% + % = %
4)
In 2002, percentage of In 2002, percentage of Sum
Thais whose primary Americans whose primary
occupation was in occupation was in
agriculture agriculture
% + % = %
5)
In 2000, percentage of In 2000, percentage of Sum
Thais who reported Americans who reported
they were of Chinese they were of African
ethnicity ethnicity
% + % = %
51A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
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A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider group j (either A or T). For a given question q, the MLE for the true mean-squared










52The total MSE between a group￿ s answers and the correct answer consists of the sample
variance and the squared group bias. Where xjq is the average answers for group j members











Since the sample variance is the part of total MSE that does not come from group bias and




jq = (1 ￿b ￿jq)c ￿2
jq
Substitution of (17) into (18) then gives





















Since the questions are assumed to be independent, the MLE for ￿j is just the















Similarly, question independence implies that averaging across questions gives the MLE for















53A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assuming that nT￿T + nA￿A + ￿s = 1 so that the sum of the weights put on all pieces of






(xTk ￿ Truth) + ￿A
nA X
k=1
(xAk ￿ Truth) + ￿s(xs ￿ Truth)
!2
Also assume the group biases are uncorrelated,
E((xTkT ￿ Truth)(xAkA ￿ Truth)) = 0,

























The ￿rst two terms in the above expression describe the expected MSE of all the observed
Thai answers and the error that comes from the shared group bias among the nT Thais (a
total of nT(nT ￿ 1) interactions). The next two terms capture the analogous errors for the
observed American answers. The next-to-last term describes the shared group bias between
the subject herself and the other Thais she observes. The ￿nal term describes the subject￿ s
own perceived MSE.
Taking the derivatives with respect to the weights gives the expressions in Proposition 2.
QED.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the case when a subject uses observed answers for the sum question to update
her answer for the Bangkok/Thailand question. A subject updates her answer for the
Bangkok/Thailand question based on her initial answer for the Bangkok/Thailand question
54and the distance between the answers she observes for the sum question and her initial
answer for the sum question.
When she observes nA American answers and nT Thai answers, her expected mean-
squared prediction error is
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where ￿A is the weight given to American answers for the sum question and ￿T is the weight
given to other Thai answers for the sum question.
Taking the derivatives with respect to ￿A and ￿T gives the optimal weights. The optimal
weight ratio
￿A
￿T can be expressed as a function of the optimal weight ratios derived in Propo-
sition 2 for how subjects should weigh American information relative to Thai information














































yA = (1 + (nA ￿ 1)￿Aa)(1 ￿ ￿Ta)
yT = (1 + (nA ￿ 1)￿At)(1 ￿ ￿Tt)
If the perceived group bias shares for Thais for the Thailand and US questions, ￿Tt and


























This gives the desired result:















Where the subscript i denotes the individual, j denotes the group (either A or T), and q






In the above equation, sTq is the standard deviation of the Thai answers, sAq is the standard
deviation of the American answers, and yTq is the mean of the Thai answers, for question q.
Another possibility is to just use the standard deviation of the Thai answers to standard-
ize the data. For questions where Thais have a small standard deviation, this standardization
would cause the standardized American mean to be far from zero if the American and Thai
means are di⁄erent. These points can then have excessive in￿ uence on the regression re-
ported in the text. Still, the results remains similar if the data are standardized in this
way.
56A.3.2 Estimates in Table 9
In Section 7, I described the procedure for estimating potential gains for the case when
subjects observe direct information. Here, I describe the analogous procedure for estimating
potential improvements when they observe information about the sum question that they
can use to update their answers. Consider the case when subjects use the information that
they observe about the sum question to update their answers for the Bangkok/Thailand
questions.
The optimal MSE that subjects could attain can be estimated by regressing the correct
answer to the Thailand question, Truthqt, on the initial answer the subject gave to the Thai-
land question, the di⁄erence between the observed American average for the sum question
and the subject￿ s answer to the sum question, and the di⁄erence between the observed Thai
average for the sum question and the subject￿ s answer to the sum question.
Truthqt = ￿sxiqt + ￿A;Thai(xiAqs ￿ xiqs) + ￿T;Thai(xiTqs ￿ xiqs) + "iqt
Analogous to equation (15), ￿s is restricted to equal one. The estimated optimal MSE is the
mean squared distance between Truthqt and xiqt+b ￿A;Thai(xiAqs￿xiqs)+b ￿T;Thai(xiTqs￿xiqs).
Now consider the MSE subjects would attain if they used the actual estimated weights
without the variation in the error term. Equation (15) gives estimates of the predicted
answer b yiqt, where
b yiqt = xiqt + b ￿A;Thai(xiAqs ￿ xiqs) + b ￿T;Thai(xiTqs ￿ xiqs) + "iqt
The second column in Table 9 gives the MSE that subjects would attain by choosing b yiqt,
relative to the optimal MSE.
To estimate the loss that comes from subjects overweighing their initial answers, I use
the regression
Truthqt = xiqt + ￿A;Thai(xiAqs ￿ xiqs) + ￿T;Thai(xiTqs ￿ xiqs) + "iqt (19)






= 1:34, as reported in Table 8. Everything
proceeds in the same way for the case where subjects use information about the sum question
to update for the Boston/US questions. For that case, regression (19) is estimated under
the constraint ￿A;US = 2:79￿T;US.
A.4 Additional Tables
Dependent variable:  Subjects' final answers
Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subject's initial answer (bs,1) .464 .474 .48 .492 .731 .731 .731 .728
(.02) (.02) (.021) (.021) (.019) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Initial answer i number of observed .003 .001 .013 .001 -.001 -.001
         American answers (bs,2) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024)
Initial answer inumber of observed .041 .045 -.002 .002
         Thai answers (bs,3) (.024) (.024) (.026) (.026)
Initial answer iaccuracy index (bs,4) -.273 .266
(.127) (.13)
Thai average (bT,1) .09 .086 .054 .064 .068 .07 .064 .076
(.03) (.03) (.036) (.036) (.02) (.025) (.028) (.032)
Thai average i number of observed -.015 -.004 .003 .006 .011 .008
         American answers (bT,2) (.034) (.035) (.038) (.03) (.031) (.03)
Thai average inumber of observed -.053 -.038 -.024 -.017
         Thai answers (bT,3) (.038) (.041) (.037) (.037)
Thai average iaccuracy index (bT,4) -.123 -.151
(.221) (.204)
American average (bA,1) .463 .481 .476 .455 .165 .092 .088 .081
(.019) (.02) (.021) (.021) (.024) (.037) (.037) (.038)
American average i number of observed .075 .09 .07 -.07 -.069 -.061
         American answers (bA,2) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.032) (.032) (.032)
American average inumber of observed -.046 -.053 -.023 -.012
         Thai answers (bA,3) (.024) (.024) (.025) (.025)
American average iaccuracy index (bA,4) .398 .351
(.124) (.139)
Number of observations 1052 1032 1032 1032 557 548 548 548
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
      saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
      (meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
Questions about US Questions about sum
Table A1:  Estimated weights for the US and sum questions
58Dependent variable:  Correct answers to the questions
Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subject's initial answer (bs,1) .292 .289 .266 .285 .063 .057 .042 .086 .179 .148 .152 .142
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.019) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.014) (.026) (.028) (.029) (.022)
Initial answer i number of observed .034 .052 .032 -.055 -.048 -.029 -.117 -.118 -.121
         American answers (bs,2) (.024) (.024) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.015) (.034) (.034) (.025)
Initial answer inumber of observed -.114 -.115 -.079 -.095 .018 -.044
         Thai answers (bs,3) (.023) (.02) (.02) (.016) (.036) (.027)
Initial answer iaccuracy index (bs,4) -.897 -.747 -.517
(.086) (.083) (.132)
Thai average (bT,1) .458 .437 .497 .403 .115 .079 .092 .157 .25 .249 .247 .405
(.022) (.023) (.025) (.023) (.02) (.02) (.021) (.016) (.024) (.032) (.034) (.027)
Thai average i number of observed -.145 -.187 -.151 -.137 -.135 -.056 .038 .038 .022
         American answers (bT,2) (.029) (.029) (.026) (.023) (.023) (.019) (.035) (.035) (.026)
Thai average inumber of observed .182 .144 .036 .118 -.006 -.001
         Thai answers (bT,3) (.028) (.025) (.022) (.018) (.036) (.027)
Thai average iaccuracy index (bT,4) -.231 -1.406 -2.316
(.091) (.1) (.154)
American average (bA,1) .25 .274 .237 .312 .822 .865 .866 .757 .571 .603 .601 .453
(.018) (.019) (.02) (.018) (.016) (.016) (.017) (.014) (.026) (.036) (.038) (.029)
American average i number of observed .112 .135 .119 .192 .183 .084 .08 .08 .099
         American answers (bA,2) (.024) (.026) (.022) (.019) (.019) (.015) (.033) (.033) (.025)
American average inumber of observed -.068 -.028 .043 -.023 -.011 .045
         Thai answers (bA,3) (.025) (.022) (.019) (.015) (.031) (.023)
American average iaccuracy index (bA,4) 1.128 2.153 2.833
(.064) (.082) (.14)
Number of observations 1008 986 986 986 1052 1032 1032 1032 557 548 548 548
Notes:
(1) Regression standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The regression in column (1) includes the data for questions 4 and 8 where subjects
     saw either 0, 5, 10, or 20 American and Thai answers.
(3) Regressions include dummies for the three question categories
     (meteorology, economic/political, and social/cultural).
(4) The regressions are estimated under the constraints:
      bs,1 + bA,1+ bT,1 = 1 and bs,j+ bA,j+ bT,j = 0 for j = 2, 3, or 4.
Questions about Thailand Questions about US Questions about sum
Table A2:  MSE minimizing behavior for the all three types of questions
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